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From One Referendum to the Other:
the Scottish Dimension to the
Debate over Europe
D'un référendum à l'autre: la dimension écossaise du débat sur l'Europe
Pauline Schnapper
1 The Scottish referendum on 18 September 2014 was not only about the future of Scotland
as  an independent  country  and the  future  of  the  United  Kingdom as  a  union state,
important though that obviously was. It was also about the position of both Scotland and
Britain in the European Union and about the more general role of sub-state entities in the
EU, as the presence of many Catalans, Corsicans, Basques and others in the streets of
Edinburgh  on  referendum  day  illustrated.  The  European  dimension to  the  Scottish
referendum was obvious in the debates preceding the ballot,  with the conditions for
Scottish membership of the EU one of the main issues – together with the economy and
defence – debated during the campaign, both directly and through the question of the
currency of a possible independent Scotland. Europe was one issue which Yes supporters
used  to  express  the  growing  discrepancy  between  the  Scottish  and  English  political
scenes.
2 The Scottish referendum can also be related to another, still putative referendum. The
negative result of the vote on 18 September is likely to have an impact on the debate
about a possible British exit from the EU if a referendum is organised in 2017, as promised
by David Cameron in his Bloomberg speech on 23 January 2013, since Scottish public
opinion is deemed more pro-European, or less eurosceptic, than the English one. With
Scotland still  part of the UK for the foreseeable future, a negative referendum on EU
membership based on a majority of negative English votes could stir a political crisis in
Scotland and renew calls for independence.
3 There  is  therefore  a  complex  dynamic  between  the  Scottish  and  the  European
referendums which did not  stop in September 2014.  This  is  what this  paper aims to
explore along four main dimensions. First the role of the EU in the Scottish referendum
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campaign will be assessed. It will appear that the SNP used Europe strategically in order
to strengthen its case for independence, building on a supposed difference in European
outlook between Scotland and England, the reality of which I will assess in section two by
looking at opinion polls north and south of the border. Then I will show that this strategy
collided with the extreme wariness of EU officials and European heads of government
towards the idea of Scottish independence, for fear of encouraging further secession in
Europe. Finally I will attempt to gauge the possible consequences of the Scottish No vote
on the future of Britain in Europe.
 
Europe as an asset in the yes campaign
4 Europe played a significantly different part in the Scottish referendum campaign from
what  it  usually  does  in  British  general  elections,  illustrating  the  growing  difference
between the London and Edinburgh political scenes. Unlike in the UK as a whole, the
British eurosceptic parties are electorally very weak in Scotland, even if UKIP managed to
win one seat there for the first time in the May 2014 European election. The Conservative
party is only the third party in Scotland. The other parties on the Scottish political scene,
the  SNP,  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats,  are  all  officially  pro-European.  Scottish
membership of the EU was therefore not discussed per se in the referendum campaign, as
the  economic  and  social  benefits  of  membership  are  not  controversial  in  Scotland.
Instead it was used as a tool by the Yes campaign.
5 This is not a new phenomenon. The SNP has pushed for “Independence in Europe” since
1988,  acknowledging that sovereignty was relative in an interdependent world.  Party
leaders reached the conclusion that Europe would guarantee real autonomy for Scotland
in a way which being a region in the UK did not.1 Indeed the national government and its
policies would be made irrelevant. Membership of a wide single market would reduce the
need for protection from the central state, which under the coalition government has
reduced spending on the welfare state and is accused of neglecting the economic interests
of  the  periphery.  Europe  would  also  reduce  the  costs  of  secession  and  improve  the
prospect of economic viability, a crucial argument in the SNP campaign.2 Membership of
the EU, and of NATO for that matter, also provide an alternative source of security to the
one traditionally provided by the nation-state.3 As Michael Keating put it, “the European
institutional structure furnishes a set of opportunities for nonstate actors to intervene,
gain recognition, build systems of action, and secure protection”.4 It also allows Scottish
nationalism to describe itself as inclusive and internationalist, as opposed to the English
Tory/UKIP increasingly anti-EU nationalism. In other words, as Ichijo put it:
Europe helps the Scots to assert their moral superiority over, above all, the English
and other nations in the world. They see themselves as a people with high moral
standards – they care for community more than money. Unlike in many eurosceptic
views, here the EU is not seen as an obstruct [sic] for democracy but as a defender
of decent societal values.5
6 The yes campaign used two main arguments. First, at the moment Scotland cannot fully
enjoy the benefits of EU membership because it is represented by London in Brussels.
Under the Scotland Act 1998, European policy is decided in London, where the Cabinet
takes  into account the specific  interests  of  Scotland,  Wales  and Northern Ireland.  In
Brussels, the UK representation similarly defends Scottish interests within the overall
British position defined in London. A 1998 Memorandum of Understanding and three
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Concordats  have  established the  details  of  decision-making and made it  possible  for
Scottish ministers to attend the European Councils on some occasions. But the SNP did
not see this as sufficient to safeguard Scottish interests in the EU:
Although Scottish Ministers can ask to attend Council, they can only do so with the
permission of the relevant Secretary of State, and if granted permission to speak,
must speak to the agreed UK negotiating line. This should in theory be a line that
they have contributed to and agreed. However in practice the UK does not always
ask for the views of Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, still less give those views
due weight. Indeed, experience shows that a lead UK Department will rarely pursue
a Scottish policy interest if it conflicts with their own dominant objective even if, as
with the fishing industry, Scotland has the majority interest.6
Instead, with independence: 
Scottish Ministers would be able to attend all Council meetings, and would be able
to  directly  engage  in  key  areas  of  decision  making  which  only  UK  Ministers
currently participate in, such as the future financing of the EU. We could prioritise
issues  for  ourselves  as  a  nation,  and  build  alliances  with  other  countries  to
negotiate to get the result which best serves our national interest.7 
7 More money would flow from the common agricultural policy (CAP),  Nicola Sturgeon
even argued in a speech in January 2014.8 This was conveniently ignoring that, actually,
research has shown that UK European decision-making smoothly adapted to devolution
after 1997 and even after 2007, when the SNP was in power. The British representation in
Brussels, in particular, has always been careful to include Scottish representatives and
specific Scottish interests, such as in fisheries or structural funds, into its remit.9 The
SNP’s priority was to stress differences rather than acknowledge this rather successful
process.
8 The second argument had to do with the current debate about a possible ‘Brexit’  in
London and the weight of eurosceptic views in England, especially in the Conservative
party and UKIP.  Under these new circumstances,  the Scottish Government had a fair
point in arguing that “only independence will secure Scotland’s long term membership of
the EU”.10 It put it clearly in 2013:
It seems clear that the UK has embarked on a path that will, at the very least, result
in the UK Government having an increasingly marginalised role in key negotiations
held in Brussels that will determine the future course of European integration. The
Scottish Government wants Scotland to be at the heart of the EU decision-making
process.  That  will  only  be  possible  if  Scotland  is  able  to  take  its  place  as  an
independent member of the EU.11
9 The argument resonated even more as  more backbench Conservative eurosceptics  in
London put pressure on Cameron about an in/out referendum and contemplated leaving
the EU.12
10 If Scottish voters wanted to stay in the EU, their best chance was therefore to vote Yes in
the referendum. The SNP insisted that 18 months would be enough to secure transition to
a new membership of the EU if voters chose independence, on the basis of article 48 of
Treaty on the European Union which provides for amendments to the existing treaty
through ordinary revision procedure, without the need to negotiate a new treaty.13 In
their view Scotland would be able to keep the UK’s opt-outs on the euro, the Schengen
agreement,  Justice and Home Affairs (which is actually an opt-in) and a share of the
British rebate on the EU budget. On the currency, which proved a central point in the
debate, the SNP recalled Scotland would not meet the convergence criteria to adopt the
euro and therefore should be able to keep the pound.
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Scottish opinion on Europe
11 This strategy was based on the idea that on Europe the SNP was in tune with Scottish
public opinion and that there was less hostility to the EU in Scotland than in England.
This was not true in the 1975 referendum, when Scottish voters voted in favour of staying
in the EC by a majority of 58% against 65% for the UK as a whole.14 By the late 1980s
though, public opinion in Scotland had indeed become more positive about membership
of the EC, especially among SNP voters, at least partly as a result of the EC regional policy
which granted millions of pounds to Scotland annually. A poll conducted in 1993 showed
support for membership higher by 4 points in Scotland than in England (49% against 45%
), a significant though not dramatic difference. As Ichijo put it in 2008: 
[T]he difference between Scottish opinion and that of the British is not particularly
strong.  However  this  discrepancy  has  been  repeatedly  observed  in  polls  and
analyses. The pattern is that Scots are more reluctant to oppose EU membership
than the British people as a whole.15 
12 This  has become even truer since the issue of  a  referendum on EU membership has
resurfaced in the political debate in 2011, as the two polls shown here illustrate, the first
















Leave the EU 10% 11% 11% 13% 14% 19% 17%
Stay and reduce EU powers 36% 37% 29% 31% 36% 40% 41%
Leave things as they are 21% 21% 24% 27% 21% 25% 23%
Stay and increase EU powers 14% 13% 19% 12% 13% 8% 7%
Work  for  single  Euro
government
9% 9% 8% 7% 5% 3% 3%
Don’t know 10% 8% 8% 9% 11% 6% 8%
Source :  Scottish Social Attitudes, 1999-2014, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/
what-should-be-britains-long-term-policy-on-the-european-union#table. 
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Source: YouGov, 15-16 June 2014, http://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/06/17/eu-referendum-record-lead/
.
13 Whereas results in Britain showed a large part of the British population ready to leave the
EU (between 40 and 50%, although the figure dropped to 36% after the summer), the
percentage  of  Scottish voters  supporting  exit  has  always  been  below 20%.  Research
recently conducted on euroscepticism in different UK constituencies also showed that, on
the whole, Scotland was more pro-European than England.16
14 But the graph also shows that the extent of europhilia in Scotland needs to be qualified,
since the federalist options (increasing the EU’s powers and forming a single European
government)  only  appealed  to  10% of  the  respondents  in  2014  against  23% in  1999.
Turnout in European elections is as low in Scotland as in the rest of the UK (33.5% in 2014,
35% in the UK as a whole) and opposition to the euro is also widespread, although less
radical than in the UK.17 In 2001 already, Heasly had shown that euroscepticism did exist
in Scotland (and Wales) and that much of Scottish pro-Europeanism was “instrumental”
or utilitarian, as opposed to really europhile, i.e. based on the immediate benefits drawn,
in particular, from structural funds rather than as a matter of principle.18 The difference
between Scottish  and English  voters  on Europe,  though real,  should  nevertheless  be
qualified.
 
The backlash against the yes campaign
15 The SNP’s strategic use of the EU to strengthen the case for independence met difficulties
and opposition from a number of sources, which dented the impact it was able to make.
As early as 2012, Alex Salmond had claimed that he had received legal advice confirming
that an independent Scotland would be an automatic member of the EU and would inherit
the UK’s opt-outs. It appeared after a few months that there was no such official legal
advice, exposing his stance as unrealistic.19
16 This weakness was used by the British Government which insisted that EU membership
would not be automatic, whatever the SNP originally said:20 
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[S]ince an independent Scottish state would be a new state, it would have to go
through some form of accession process to become a member of  the EU, which
would involve negotiations on the precise terms of its membership. It cannot be
assumed  that  Scotland  would  be  able  to  negotiate  the  favourable  terms of  EU
membership which the UK enjoys […] Scotland’s negotiations to join the EU could
be complex and long,  and the outcome could prove less  advantageous than the
status quo.21
17 The point was reinforced by leading EU figures both before and during the campaign. Jose
Manuel  Barroso,  the  president  of  the  Commission  and  Herman  von  Rompuy,  the
president of the Council, insisted that an independent Scotland would have to go through
a lengthy and possibly unsuccessful process to join the EU, not through article 48 but
through the normal procedure of article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty.22 Barroso, in particular,
said it  would be “difficult,  if  not  impossible” for Scotland to join the EU because of
opposition from other member states with secessionist movements such as Spain, which
for instance had still not recognised the independence of Kosovo, prompting an angry
reaction from Alex Salmond.23 Doubts were also voiced within the EU, and not just the
British Government, as to whether Scotland would be able to keep Britain’s opt-outs if it
applied under article 49.24 
18 This barrage of criticism against the SNP undermined its strategy of independence in the
EU and made it more difficult to sell it to the Scottish public. Whether it had an impact on
the vote in the referendum ballot is nevertheless doubtful. Membership of the EU was
apparently not a decisive factor in voters’ choices. A poll conducted by Lord Ashcroft
immediately after the referendum showed that EU membership was an important issue
only for 12% of the Yes voters and 15% of the No voters, well behind domestic issues such
as the NHS, pensions and defence.25
19 These criticisms also illustrated the impact of the referendum well beyond the British
shores. Many EU member states felt extremely uncomfortable at the prospect of Scottish
independence, not just because it would weaken one of the bigger states but because it
would create a precedent for other separatist regions in countries like Spain or Belgium.
Van Rompuy’s insistence that “nobody has anything to gain from separatism in the world
of today which, whether one likes it or not, is globalised” was telling in that respect.26 The
“Europe of the Regions” celebrated at the time of the Maastricht treaty was no longer a
reference  for  European  institutions  at  a  time  when the  EU was  moving  towards  an
increasingly intergovernmental framework as a result, in particular, of the financial and
economic crisis. The voice of sub-state entities was no longer really celebrated in official
discourse.
 
Consequences on the EU referendum
20 The  Scottish  referendum  has  also  revealed  other  dynamics  at  play  in  the  UK
constitutional and European debate in the context of another promised referendum. In
England,  David  Cameron  was,  as  we  have  seen,  under  growing  pressure  from  his
backbenchers to promise a referendum on British membership. At first he resisted it, to
the point of imposing a three-line whip against a motion demanding such a ballot in
October 2011. But as he was also confronted with the spectacular rise of UKIP in opinion
polls  (which then translated  into  a  victory  in  the  May 2014  European elections  and
victories in two by-elections in the autumn that year), he promised in January 2013 to
renegotiate  the  terms  of  British  membership  of  the  EU  and  to  organise  an  in/out
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referendum in 2017 should the Conservatives still  be in power after the 2015 general
election.27 
21 If the referendum takes place in 2016 or 2017 following a Conservative victory in the 2015
general election, the result of the Scottish independence vote will be significant. Scotland
having voted to stay in the UK in 2014, Scottish voters would increase the probability of
an overall positive result for staying in the EU. The impact would be limited since the
Scottish population only represents 8% of  the overall  UK population,  but it  could be
significant if the results are close. 
22 On the other hand, if the UK as a whole, but not Scotland, chooses to leave the EU, the gap
between the English and Scottish public opinion about Brexit could prove a major issue.
This would most probably create a major political crisis in Scotland, where the SNP in
particular could argue that the Scots are taken out of the EU against their will. This is
why the new leader of the SNP, Sturgeon suggested Scotland should have a say:
Should a Bill be tabled in the House of Commons for a referendum on European
Union  membership,  my  party  will  table  an  amendment.  That  amendment  will
require  that  for  the UK to leave the EU,  each of  the four constituent  nations -
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland - would have to vote to do so, not
just the UK as a whole. This proposal transforms the terms of the UK debate on
Europe - which so far has been all about the Westminster parties dancing to UKIP's
tune. It would give proper protection against any of the nations of the UK being
removed from the EU against their will.28
23 Unsurprisingly, Cameron immediately rejected the proposal and said there would be only
one  constituency  in  a  referendum on  the  EU and  that  votes  would  not  be  counted
regionally, in order to reduce the damaging political impact of widespread differences
between the nations. Yet it is likely that the voting figures, or at least opinion polls,
would  become  public  and  these  differences  would  not  stay  concealed.  In  that  case
pressure  for  organising  a  new referendum on Scottish  independence  would  increase
again,  a campaign which would be launched by the SNP but which would be equally
embarrassing for Scottish Labour and Scottish Liberal Democrats, who would be caught
between their support for a united kingdom and their wish for continued membership of
the EU.
24 There are also lessons to be learnt from the Scottish referendum campaign for a possible
future  EU  referendum  campaign.  First,  the  level  of  civic  engagement  and  political
participation in Scotland was impressive during the campaign and bodes well  for an
equally  important  referendum  on  the  future  of  the  UK  in  Europe.  If  the  campaign
manages to draw as much attention and participation in the debate and the vote itself,
this could increase the chances of a positive result since we know that opinion about the
benefits of EU membership is particularly volatile in the UK.
 
Conclusion
25 The Scottish independence referendum has sharply illustrated the difference in attitudes
towards  the  European  Union  between  England  and  Scotland.  Whereas  the  English
national  debate is  now about  whether to remain in the EU or  not,  the campaign in
Scotland was whether independence was the best way to ensure that Scotland would
remain in Europe. The Yes campaign attempted (unsuccessfully, it turned out) to use the
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argument to press voters to support independence in spite of open hostility from several
EU quarters to the prospect of Scottish independence.
26 The 18 September ballot was also revealing of more possible tensions in the future if a
referendum on a British exit from the EU does take place in 2016 or 2017, as promised by
the Conservative Party. With a majority of Scottish voters opposed to leaving the EU, a
negative vote in the UK would trigger another constitutional crisis between England and
Scotland. Unionist parties would most likely have to accept another Scottish referendum
on independence, with the momentum for secession much stronger than in 2014. The fate
of Scotland and of Britain in the EU will be closely intertwined.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper examines the role played by the European issue in the Scottish referendum campaign,
especially  the  way the  SNP tried to  use  it  to  its  advantage.  It  also  focusses  on the  complex
interplay between the Scottish referendum on independence and the possible future referendum
on ‘Brexit’ which was promised by David Cameron for 2017, in particular looking at the different
scenarios possible.
Cet  article  examine  le  rôle  joué  par  la  question  de  l'appartenance  d'une  éventuelle  Écosse
indépendante à l'Union européenne pendant la campagne référendaire et l'utilisation qui en a
été  faite  par  le  camp  indépendantiste.  Il  met  en  lumière  la  dialectique  complexe  entre  le
référendum  écossais  et  l'organisation  éventuelle  d'un  référendum  sur  le  ‘Brexit’,  promis  par
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